Social Capital as a Determinant of Economic Growth in Africa by Jerven, Morten
‘Social Capital as a Determinant of Economic Growth in Africa’ 
 





This paper reviews the methodology and evidence of recent regression literature 
attributing the African growth shortfall to lack of social capital. It finds that the literature 
is not able to account for the actual economic growth experience, only in a significantly 
reformulated and misleading way. The paper considers how social capital is defined and 
which proxies are used in the literature, and notes considerable theoretical and empirical 
inconsistency. In conclusion the paper supports the contention that social capital is best 
understood as an outcome, and not a cause of growth. At the present state of the literature 
explaining economic growth the use of social capital as a determinant. has not been 




Recent regression papers evaluating economic performance in Sub-Saharan Africa in the 
post-independence years have been finding that lack of social capital explains large parts 
of the relative growth shortfall of the African economies. This is in tune with the recent 
general increased focus on social capital across different social science disciplines. In this 
paper these findings will be examined and critiqued from an African economic history 
perspective. The term regression literature is in the paper used shorthand for the empirical 
growth literature using cross country regression analysis applying a near global sample, 
regressing on a averaged growth in real GDP over the last three or four decades. This 
paper is focusing specifically on the papers where the main focus has been to find the 
causes of slow African growth, or ‘eliminating the African dummy’ as it is usually 
phrased in that literature.   
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The main target for the discussion is a paper by P. Collier & J. W. Gunning, ‘Explaining 
African Economic Performance’ published in the  Journal of Economic Literature 37 
(March 1999). The authors, in addition to contributing with a regression themselves, 
synthesize the evidence on African growth reached after a decade of running regressions. 
This paper although relatively dated (1999) is still considered as an up to date and 
authoritative study. This is evidenced by the fact that in their recent contribution to the 
Handbook of Economic Growth  Durlauf, Johnson and Temple (2005) refer to this 1999 
paper by Collier and Gunning together with W. Easterly and R. Levine, ‘Africa’s Growth 
Tragedy: Politics and Ethnic Divisions’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, (1997) as the 
most important regression papers on African economic growth. Furthermore, Collier has 
contributed both to theory and empirical research advocating social capital as a useful 
analytical concept to understanding growth in Africa.  
 
Their conclusion of the review of the evidence Collier and Gunning is that “the lack of 
openness to trade and the low level of social capital have had large, damaging effects on 
the growth rate.” (1999:74). In this paper the emphasis will be on this alleged low social 
capital and its economic effects. It is important to note that while trade policy receives 
mention as a separate causal factor in this conclusion, it is elsewhere posited that the lack 
of openness to trade is directly caused by the lack of social capital.  Collier and Gunning 
differentiates between public and civic social capital, and it is the lack of the former 
which has caused policies detrimental to growth. In particular through “sins of 
commission” (1999:64) where autocratic governments relying on narrow constituencies 
overtly taxed the unrepresented ‘masses of rural producers’ and protected favoured elites 
giving opportunities for rent-seeking activities and corruption. The central finding of the 
regression literature then is that ‘Lack of Social Capital’ is prominent factor explaining 
slow growth of African economies. 
 
In this paper it will be described how social capital has been defined, and how it has 
entered the growth equations. Particular attention will be paid to how social capital has 
been measured, and how it is affecting growth. Having established the methods of   3
proxying social capital, it will be examined how well these ways of capturing social 
capital provides a coherent causal explanatory framework.  This paper will then analyze 
how social capital has been used and understood as an independent variable having 
economic effects. This specific causal claim will be investigated. It will be shown that 
social capital may be an elusive concept, and being applied by the elusive method of 
regression analysis the end result is incoherent. While social capital is a useful analytical 
concept in specific situations, to capture, measure and to quantify its direct independent 
economic effect is very difficult. In result the conclusions of the regression papers 
solving the African growth shortfall with social capita appears more misleading than 
illuminating.   
 
It is intuitive that social capital matters for economic activity or that economic activity 
matters of social capital in some ways. Social capital understood as networking creating 
through trust building or increasing social cohesion would undeniably have some kind of 
economic effects. On the other hand it also seems reasonable to assert that economic 
activity has social affects. Doing business together repeatedly would increase such things 
as trust and networking as a side effect, albeit arguably an important one. Putnam’s 
(1993) famous example of the choir is a different case, where the cause is entirely social, 
and the economic effect only marginal. ‘A choir cannot be explained by economic 
causes, nor can it s existence be justified by its economic effects’ (Collier 1998:3). The 
identification of such social interaction that has an economic externality is one thing, it is 
quite another to distinguish different types of social interaction in countries and assign 
major macroeconomic effects. Recall that Collier and Gunning concluded that a ‘lack of 
social capital’ had ‘large damaging effects’ on economic growth in African economies.  
 
This is a bold claim indeed. While it seems to fair to guess that the way social capital is 
expressed in African economies would be in some certain ways different, it is not that 
clear that this difference amounts to a definite negative effect.  It begs the question – 
what is the social capital that Africa is lacking? And more specifically through which 
channels does those large damaging effects? Clearly, it is not a lack of choirs in Africa it 
is referred to.  In one way it is also strikingly counterintuitive. This has been made clear   4
to me when I have presented the results of regressions to friends and colleagues. They 
would inquire – so what is this ‘social capital’? I would explain that it is networking, 
effects of social interaction, trust etc. – to which my conversation partner would respond 
surprised, that clearly, this must be exactly what Africans are not lacking. It seems 
unreasonable to say to a destitute, illiterate and landless individual that she or he is 
lacking precisely the only thing that he or she has got. In lack of everything else it is just 
some social capital through which one keeps alive – relying on pennies from a general 
feeling of solidarity in the society or help from family and relatives. 
 
 Before returning to the specific issue of how social capital is defined and measured in the 
empirical growth literature a short intellectual history of how social capital entered the 
growth equation is in place. It will be argued that this more an ad hoc prompted invention 
than a theory based innovation.  
 
Social Capital in the Growth Equation – From ‘A’ to ‘Z’ 
 
This section will give a brief outline of the theoretical and methodological foundations of 
the cross-country growth regressions. It does not by far provide a complete intellectual 
history of the endeavours to explain economic growth. It is intended to show how 
explaining growth went from ‘A’ to ‘Z’ – from growth accounting focusing on the 
residual ‘A’, to ‘Barro-type regressions’ where the emphasis is on the various ‘Z’ 
variables. The process has been eclectic and incremental, and it is necessary to explain 
where the regression literature on African economic growth originated to have a full 
appreciation of the context.  
 
The empirical growth literature attempts to explain the process of economic growth. 
Economic growth is at one level an elementary process resulting from the employment of 
capital and labour in production. Economic growth is either the result of increase in the 
factors of production, or a result of more effective use of these productive factors. The 
former is referred to as extensive growth, and the latter as intensive growth. This can be   5
formalized as it is done in the basic growth accounting model, where different sources of 
growth is distinguished as follows
2: 
 
∆Y/Y = α∆K/K + β∆L/L + ∆A/A  
 
Here the increment in growth (Y) is accounted for by the increments in capital (K) and 
labour (L) where α and β represent the elasticity between an increase in capital or labour 
respectively and an increase in output. ‘A’ is calculated as the residual, and is referred to 
as total factor productivity (TFP) in the literature. TFP growth is what would be called 
intensive growth, and encompasses all the increase in output that is not accounted for by 
the increments in labour and capital. ‘A’ can be interpreted as technological progress or 
an increase in productivity. That interpretation is by assumption only, and can also be 
“appropriately understood as unexplained. It is the extent of our ignorance in 
understanding the contributions to growth.” (Fine 2001:116)  The Solow-model 






The expression is similar to the standard growth accounting equation. ‘A’ is the state of 
technology, determined exogenously.  By specifying the return to capital and labour as 
equalling 1 return to scale is constant, and return to capital is less than 1, that is 
diminishing return to capital. This model then predicts convergence in growth rates as 
less capital intensive economies will benefit from increasing returns by increasing capital. 
This model was reformulated to include factors of production that do increase 
proportionally, specifically human capital. This is what is known as the augmented Solow 
model (Mankiw, Romer and Weil 2002). This addition to the neo-classical model was 
stimulated by the simultaneous development of a new theory of growth. It was concluded 
in that seminal paper that the augmented model explained 80 percent of the cross country 
variation in income (Ibid: 408). The progress towards explaining the remaining 20 
percent was helped by inputs from the endogenous growth modelling. 
                                                 
2 This is the generic expression and is taken from Crafts (2002)   6
 
Prompted by the developments in micro economic theory emphasising market 
imperfections and the lack of evidence of the convergence predicted by the neo-classical 
model the endogenous growth theory provided a model where technological 
improvement ‘A’ is explained within the model. In this respect the endogenous growth 
model differs with the Solow model, by extending its explanatory boundary. By 
extension it contradicts the assumptions of the former model because that inclusion 
implies increasing return to scale which is incompatible with free competition. The 
specification of the endogenous growth model began with the work of Romer (1986) and 
was complemented by Lucas (1988).  In the old model growth rates were set exogenously 
(the extensive growth) and convergence would take place due to diminishing returns to 
capital. In the absence of restrictions on productive factors (knowledge and capital in 
particular) poor countries would catch up to a high income level with this predicted 
higher growth rate and convergence around the steady rate of growth set by ‘A’?  
 
Endogenous growth makes a significant departure from the old model. The interpretation 
of convergence is crucially different. The extensive growth is determined endogenously. 
The productivity growth rate of one country is determined by specific endogenous market 
imperfections. Negative impact of these imperfections causes the country to diverge from 
its own steady path of growth. A lack of convergence is then not a result of external 
barriers that hinders the economy to catch up to an income level. The emphasis in this 
model is on explaining differences in growth rates rather than in levels.  
 
 
‘Economic growth in a Cross Section of Countries’ by Barro (1991) was a seminal paper 
if there ever was one. This paper set the model for more than a decade of empirical 
research attempting to explain growth rate differentials. In his paper Barro attempted to 
single out determinants of growth using a cross section regression with a global sample of 
averaged growth rates in real per capita GDP (1960-85) for 98 countries. In his 
specification of the Barro included both the standard neo-classical growth model 
elements with the convergence term, diminishing return on capital and the conventionally   7
added investment and fertility variables, and elements from the endogenous models also 
featured. Human capital was measured by initial levels of education and policy variables 
were included. Measures of price distortions were included, aimed at picking up effects 
of government intervention in markets and government consumption to measure 
unproductive government expenditures. Political stability was measured by an index of 
revolutions, coups and assassinations to proxy security of property rights. The most 
interesting results for this argument are the convergence effect and the African dummy. 
There is not evidence for an outright convergence effect. However, Barro finds support 
for the convergence hypothesis in a modified form. If a country with a relative low level 
of initial GDP has a higher stock of human capital than would be expected from the 
country’s income level, the convergence effect applies. The African dummy was found to 
be significant and negative. This means that the slow growth of the African economies is 
not explained by the other variables included in the specification. Subsequently many 
papers have addressed this issue with the aim of eliminating the African dummy. 
 
The papers utilizing the same methodology as was innovated by Barro have simply been 
termed Barro-type regressions. Durlauf, Johnson and Temple (2005:34) provide a generic 
representation of these regressions: 
 
yi = βlogYi0 +ψXi + Zi + εi  
 
The growth rate ‘y’  in a country ‘i’ is explained with respect to the convergence term, 
income ‘Y’ in year 0. The ‘X’ contains the parameters in the Solow growth model.  
Finally, the growth rate is a determined by a range of ‘Z’ variables that lie outside of the 
Solow model. This equation has been the workhorse of empirical growth research. The 
neo-classical heritage lies in the convergence term and the Solow growth model, while 
the endogenous growth theory provided the rationale to expand the explanatory boundary 
to include a range of ‘Z’ variables. The result has been what Durlauf, Johnson and 
Temple (2005:44) call a “ ‘growth regression industry’  as researchers has added 
plausibly relevant variables to the baseline Solow specification.” The convergence term is 
also hard to interpret as discussed above, when the two paradigms understand   8
convergence in two ways, with steady income level and a steady path of rate of growth 
particular to each economy, these two different equilibriums are hard to disentangle. In 
addition, it is not clear to what extent which variables affect each other, and therefore the 
coefficients are not readily interpretable.  
 
The problem of scholars finding many different ‘Z’ variables statistically significant 
creates a considerable theoretical confusion. Levine and Renelt (1992) tried to overcome 
this by testing which independent variables were robust for the inclusion of others 
(extreme bounds analysis). This work was continued by Sala-i-Martin (1997) in his 
tellingly titled paper ‘I Just Ran Four Million Regressions’. Rather than following the 
approach of Levine and Renelt (which he judged to be too strict) he counted in how many 
types of regressions each variable came out significant. Durlauf, Johnson and Temple 
(2005:Appendix 2) report that there has been found 145 regressors have been found 
statistically significant, and therefore with an explanatory effect on the rate of growth. Of 
these 145 variables some entertain similar growth hypotheses, but differs in the measures 
used. Durlauf, Johnson and Temple (2005:74) identify 43 conceptually different 
‘theories’ of growth as being ‘proven’ in the literature. 
 
Meanwhile the focus on the two competing growth theory paradigms has been blurred. 
The inclusion of different explanatory variables has been prompted by different 
theoretical standpoints as the search for the variable explaining the African growth 
anomaly has continued. The formal theoretical growth theory testing has been abandoned 
for an ad hoc approach where different variables have been added. This process has also 
been accompanied by a development in the literature towards a preference for using 
instruments. Investment itself has been increasingly viewed as endogenous to growth, 
which it of course is, and therefore rather part of something that should be explained. In 
effect this means that as the literature has progressed more and more right hand side 
variables has appeared that are seen as important determinants of growth. The literature 
has only implicitly discussed the causes of income differentials as it has used the average 
growth rate and not total income per capita as the dependent variable. 
   9
The current outlook of the regression equation is not a result of a process of adhering to a 
strict theoretical paradigm. Rather, the equations incorporate elements of two conflicting 
theories of growth. This could be interpreted as positive – it is a result of a pragmatic goal 
oriented process. The main emphasis has been on specifying an equation that does score a 
high R
2 without relying on continent dummy variables. Consequently axiomatic strictness 
has been abandoned. In result this is not a way of testing growth theory, but to adapt to 
conflicting empirics. The results of the regressions are then very hard to interpret. In the 
end you have a wide range of statistical correlations. There has been no definite 
settlement as regards the dynamics of labour, capital and technology. The convergence 
term is nearly impossible to interpret. Lastly, the range of 145 ‘Z’ variables 
complementing 43 theories of growth leaves us with a rather inconclusive end-product. 
 
The direction and origin of investigation has been outlined above. The prompting factor 
was that when the theoretically founded equations were empirically tested they came out 
with a statistically significant African dummy. The search for this inexplicably bad 
performance of the African economies has brought out a range of different suggestions, 
but no definite answers. Social capital has become to be viewed as the potential ‘missing 
link’. Mankiw, Romer and Weil concluded as reported above that the augmented Solow 
Model left 20 percent of the growth differentials unexplained. This ‘unexplained’ bit is 
signified by the African dummy, and the quest has been to eliminate it. Recently, through 
applying different proxies of social capital this elimination has been successful.  
 
Defining and Measuring Social Capital 
 
To return to our specific discussion, the following discussion will be occupied with how 
the causal claim of a lack of social capital having large and damaging affects on 
economic growth the evidence brought forward to back to claim up is reviewed below.  
The lack of social capital is indeed the ‘original sin’ for C&G. It causes ‘bad’ policies 
such as restrictive trade policy and deficient public services, aggravates unfortunate 
natural endowments, has lack of financial depth as a bi-product and makes aid inefficient.   10
Through this variable causes that normally would have been considered exogenous or 
unfortunate initial conditions are made endogenous effects from a lack of social capital.    
 
Social capital is defined as containing two components: public and civic capital. The 
former should be understood as resulting from social interaction and the latter as resulting 
from institutions. The main thrust of C&G’s argument derives from the effects of narrow 
constituencies and ethnic fractionalisation. The former relies on work by Bates (1981) 
and explains ‘bad’ or growth retarding institutions, and the latter relies on regression 
work by Easterly and Levine (1997).  C&G reports (1999:67) that Easterly and Levine 
found that “it directly accounts for 35 percent of Africa’s growth shortfall, and because it 
is also correlated with poor policies, overall it accounts for 45 percent of the growth 
shortfall.”  However, this does not cohere with what Easterly and Levine report 
(1997:1234) “The direct effect explains […] 0.2 percentage of the growth shortfall” and 
continues on the next page “we find that ETHNIC indirectly accounts for 28 percent of 
the 2.6 percent attributable to political/policy variables.” In conclusion “When we include 
the direct effects of ETHNIC, ETHNIC alone explains about one percentage point of the 
3.4 percentage point East Asia – Africa shortfall.” (Ibid:1236) 
There is no regression evidence explicitly supporting the Bates argument. Ethnicity is a 
poor proxy for narrow constituencies: It should be remembered that Bates’ argument 
(1983) is primarily meant to explain the differing agricultural pricing policies within 
Africa as policy outcomes determined by whether the ruling elite are rural or urban 
based, resulting in corresponding bias. The ethnicity variable is weakened by its crude 
formulation. There is good reason to believe that political instability and linguistic 
fragmentation does not increase proportionally. Rather two or three equally large groups 
have probably proved more detrimental than many small groups. Incidentally Easterly 
and Levine show this when attempting to prove that their ethnicity variable works: they 
compare the two extremes on the ethnical fragmentation measure, Japan and Tanzania. 
They find that with indirect and direct effect of ETHNIC “it accounts for about 4.1 
percentage points of the growth difference – which equals the actual growth difference.” 
(Easterly and Levine 1997:1237) While these numbers add up it must be noted that   11
ethnicity has not been ascribed a growth retarding effect by any major scholarly works on 
the economy of Tanzania. 
 
The claim of C&G is that the lack of social capital causes bad polices. The linguistic 
fragmentation has a weak ‘instrumental’ explanatory potential in this respect. It only 
displays a robust impact on the numbers of telephones per capita (Azam et. al 2002:204) 
– a variable to which one would be careful about ascribing too much growth explanatory 
potential. There are weaker relationships with some of the other policy variables – school 
attainment, financial depth, and the black market premium. Although some African 
currencies were systematically overvalued (this does not apply to the CFA countries for 
instance) its extreme values inflating the measure were shock and not policy outcomes. 
Easterly et al wrote in 1993 “If shock variables are omitted, estimates of the effect of the 
black market premium on growth will falsely attribute externally-induced adversity to 
policy.” (1993:474)  
 
‘Lack of social capital’ is also supported by some ‘subjective evidence’ i.e. different 
impressionistic rankings of various measures on institutional efficiency based on 
interviews. These descriptive data are given in Table 1. There is a critical problem of 
reverse causality associated with the use of these data. They are all observations
3  from 
the 1980s and 1990s i.e. in the latter half of the period analysed. Consequently, these are 
likely to be effects of the growth failure of the early 1980s, and not a cause of growth 
during the whole period. The data are also far from comprehensive. Kaufman (1995) uses 
only two African countries, South Africa and Nigeria. The data on corruption and 
bureaucratic inefficiency from Mauro (1995) only includes ten African countries
4, among 





                                                 
3 With the exception of the Adelman-Morris Index  (1967), this is only used by Temple (1998). 
4 The countries are Angola, Cameroon, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Zaire 
and Zimbabwe. 
5 Since this interviews was conducted in 1981-83 this is also the period where corruption was the most 
rampant in these countries.   12
Table 1:  Evidence Used in the Empirical Growth  
Literature for ‘Lack of Social Capital’
6 
                                                                                             
        SSA     Other LDCs 
Corruption      4.97    6.03 
Bureaucracy      1.38    1.72 
Enforceability     1.95    2.09 
Civil War      1.27    0.72 
Fractionalization    67.6    32.7 
Social Development    1.10    -0.43 
Inequality      31.0    31.0 
 
Notes: Corruption: data from International Country Risk Guide for 1982; low score indicates high 
corruption. Quality of bureaucracy: source as corruption, high scores indicate better quality; range is from 
0-6. Enforceability of contracts: data from Business Environmental Risk Intelligence for 1972; low scores 
indicate weak enforceability; range is 0-4. The index of fractionalization is on the range 0-100 with 
completely homogenous societies scored as zero. Adelman-Morris Index of  “social development’ as of the 
early 1960s is constructed on the effective range 1.86 (least) to -1.91 (most) over 74 countries which they 
classified as developing at the time. Inequality: the income share of the third and fourth quintiles. Sources: 
Corruption and fractionalization from Mauro (1995);  civil war (months per year) from Singer and Small 
(1994); A-M Index and inequality from Temple (1999) 
 
In conclusion, the variables used to measure the effect of social capital could be divided 
into three different categories measures of institutional quality and ethnicity with the third 
supplement of a social development index. These are all highly correlated. This is hardly 
surprising. The quest for eliminating the dummy has been through finding a measure on 
which African economies scores different than others.  The paper will return to a more 




                                                 
6 This table is reproduced from Collier and Gunning 1999 (Table 2: Socio-Political Indicators: Differences 
Between Sub-Saharan Africa and other LDCs p.67)   13
The African Growth Experience 
 
A topic not touched upon so far is the actual African growth experience. It has been 
reported that there has been an unexplainable African growth shortfall, but not how this 
presented itself in a historical context. The next section will review the growth evidence 
on Africa, and this will bring out some questions regarding the causal mechanisms 
through which social capital is supposed to have economic effects.  
 
The different papers in the empirical growth literature appear different as they apply 
some different data, and include different right hand side variables, but they have an 
important feature in common. The dependent variable is an average of real GDP per 
capita for the whole period
7.  What is being sought is an explanation of the relative 
average growth shortfall of African economies over three decades, not year to year 
changes in economic growth. This is a significant reformulation, and also an important 
reason why the regressions are able to come up with the results and conclusions which 
they do.  
 
In reality the growth pattern of Africa looks considerably different. The notion of the 
African growth failure came about in the wake of the 1973/4 and 1981 oil price shocks, 
and has increased in currency as African economies has grown become heavily indebted 
under structural adjustment, and due to the required food aid related to the Sahelian 
drought and other droughts that has plagued the continent. The regression literature in 
trying to solve the puzzle of slow growth is in this way a child of its own time. C&G 
observe this weakness themselves, admitting: “One limitation of the growth regression 
literature is that to date it has focused upon explaining long-term average African slow 
growth.” If this caveat does not hold it has serious implications for the validity of the 
conclusions drawn from the regressions. 
 
                                                 
7 The length of the period analyzed varies for the regressions. For Collier and Gunning and Easterly and 
Levine it is 1960-89, for Sachs and Warner from 1965 to 1990, while Barro and Lee only covers 1965-85   14
Figure 1 shows GDP per capita for Sub-Saharan Africa. It is clear from the graph that 
GDP per capita saw a rapid improvement from 1960 until 1974. After that there was a 
period of sluggish growth until 1981, and from that date there is a clear cut retrogression 
lasting well into the 1990s when retrogression turns into stagnation with a slight 
improvement in 1996.  
 
Figure 1:  GDP per capita 1960 – 2000 Africa (Constant 1995 USD)
 8 
 
   













Table 2 and table 3 show indexed total GDP growth for the main regions in the world. 
According to table 2 in relative terms Africa displays rapid growth in the 1960s and the 
first half of the 1970s. It grew at a higher rate than the rest of the world in average, and 
also outgrew South Asia and High Income OECD countries, while still keeping pace with 
Latin America and East Asia and Pacific. Table 3 displays the relative performance of 
Africa in the latter part of the period. It grew considerable slower than all the other 
regions from 1975 until 1990. In conclusion, African economies experienced rapid 
growth until 1975, grew faster than many regions of the world and improved GDP per 
capita significantly in that period. Slow growth and stagnation is a post 1975 
phenomenon, and it is only in this latter period that African economies were 
outperformed by the rest of the world economy, South and East Asia in particular. This 
                                                 
8 Data from the 2002 CD-ROM of World Development Indicators.     15
contrasted growth experience is the central feature of economic development in post-
colonial Sub-Saharan Africa, and therefore any coherent narrative of economic growth 
has to be able to account for and explain this shift in performance
9.  
 
Table 2: Indices for total GDP growth (1960=100) by Region 
 
  World  South Asia  East Asia  OECD  Latin America  Africa 
1965  130  122  117  131  127  130 
1970  171  150  164  170  168  166 
1975  204  170  224  200  228  208 
 
 
Table 3: Indices for total GDP growth (1975=100) by Region 
 
  World  South Asia  East Asia  OECD  Latin America  Africa 
1980  121  119  138  119  130  114 
1985  137  156  195  135  133  120 
1990  164  209  268  160  146  136 
Source: own calculations from WDI 2002 
 
The review of the African growth experience above has important implications. The 
African growth failure or growth shortfall is not a constant or incremental post-colonial 
phenomenon, but is rather a function of a collapse following the two oil-shocks in mid 
1970s and early 1980s respectively. This acknowledgement changes the interpretation of 
the growth regressions somewhat. To simplify somewhat the regressions uses two points 
of observation. One is the averaged growth rate, and the other an indicator of 
                                                 
9 This conclusion is not an artefact of my use of the WDI data. Ndulu & O’Connell (1999) finds the same 
pattern using Penn World Tables. Maddison’s data also supports the same conclusion (e.g. 1995:81 Figure 
3.3). Neither is this finding an artefact of aggregation, it is supported by individual country experiences, as 
is shown by Arrighi (2002) using data assembled by Berthelemy and Soderling (2001).      16
underdevelopment. Introducing change in growth rates complicates the picture. It is clear 
that high linguistic fragmentation or a low score on a social development index can create 
the background for a rapid growth. This acknowledgment also points to that at these 
causal factors are contingent. This means that for example ethno linguistic fragmentation 
only has only proven to be problem under special circumstances.  The basic lesson to 
draw out from the review of the data is that the caveat does not hold – the slow African 
averaged growth is a function of post 1975 retrogression, not a consistent 
underperformance. This introduces dynamics into the growth explanation, and has 
potential reverse the direction of causation – that is the reason for the low averaged 
growth lies in the post 1975 collapse in growth. The cause of this marked shift in 
performance can only partially lie in non-changing factors. A reading of this evidence 
could also be that factors such as lack of social capital are latent (or contingent) factors. 
There are also some counterfactuals at play here, which figure implicitly in the 
historiography. One says that if African economies were not suffering from a lack of 
social capital they would have dealt with these external economic shocks in a better way. 
A second route would say that the lack of social capital in African economies made 
economic policy so that they embarked on a route of economic development that lead to 
these shocks. A third interpretation is that African economies were doing fairly well, but 
that particular economic factors made the external shocks harder to deal with for the 
African economies. Those factors would be high reliance on world market prices because 
of the primary export structure of their economies, that petroleum prices were more 
important because of a less developed and less self-reliant infrastructure and thirdly that 
the financing of the industrialisation process was interrupted at a crucial time for the 
African economies because the process was embarked on later there.   
 
Those routes of explanation cannot be satisfactorily dealt with in this paper, but by 
examining the variables that are used in the empirical growth literature to proxy social 
capital closer it can be investigated how plausible the causal relationships are, and in 
what direction the causation runs.   
 
   17
Measurements of Social Capital 
 
i)  Social Development Index 
 
This index was developed by Adelman and Morris in the early 1960s, and is documented 
in Adelman and Morris (1967). This index was used by Temple and Johnson (1998), by 
Temple 1999 and as we have seen it is reported in Collier and Gunning (1999). All these 
publications refer to it explicitly as a measure of social capital. It has an advantage of 
being dated in the beginning of the period (the measures are collected from the period 
1957-1962) as opposed to the more recently done surveys of subjective evidence on 
institutional quality. Therefore the scores on this index cannot have been caused by the 
process of economic development in those countries. The index has this one advantage, 
but has on the other hand many problems. 
 
First, having been made in the intellectual milieu at the time, this index was made with 
the idea in mind that societies are to be found on a continuous line of development from 
‘traditional’ to ‘modern’. Revisionist scholarship has emphasised that this not the case, 
and that there are many paths to modernity, by rejecting the idea of unilinear model of 
development. Second, the index does not cohere with the theoretical underpinnings of 
social capital. The idea behind using social capital as a analytically distinct term from 
other types of capital or development is that the capital should have social causes, and 
economic effects. The phenomena measured needs to be unrelated from other types of 
capital accumulation, in order to make sure we are measuring growth effects that are 
caused by social capital. Table 4 shows the weighting of the factors as used by Temple 
and Johnson (1998) and Temple (1999) . In the original Adelman and Morris Index 
ethnicity was included as a variable as well. However, since the papers using the index 
uses linguistic fragmentation as a separate independent variable this part of the index was 
excluded for the purpose. 
 
 




Table 4: Socioeconomic Components of the Adelman-Morris Index 
 
                Factor Loading: 
Size of the traditional agricultural sector                -0.89 
Extent of dualism              0.84 
Extent of urbanisation             0.84 
Character of basic social organisation        0.83 
Importance of indigenous middle class        0.82 
Extent of social mobility            0.86 
Extent of literacy              0.86 
Extent of mass communications          0.88 
Crude fertility rate                       -0.63 
Degree of modernisation of outlook          0.75 
 
 
The measures listed in table 4 are again composites derived from various other measures. 
Some of the values given to countries were based on official available statistics. On other 
more impressionistic measures or when data for the characteristics were unavailable the 
countries were ranked according to the researcher’s judgment. They would give a value 
for example for Tanganyika (mainland Tanzania) on the variable ‘Degree of 
modernisation of outlook’ or another “purely judgemental indicator” (Adelman & Morris 
1967:12) based on a general feeling about the country. That value would then be sent for 
consultation to other ‘experts’. If those disagreed the value would be adjusted upwards or 
downwards accordingly.   
 
From the list it is clear that the factors are associated with economic modernisation and 
the index does not squeeze out a pure measure of social capability for modernisation or 
rapid growth. The factors listed are characteristics of a degree economic poverty, and a   19
lower level of economic development. The measure is very inclusive and contains 
measures like health, education and economic structure. The list also includes measures 
that today by general consensus are widely regarded conceptually unsound to describe 
less developed societies. Examples in point are ‘dualism’ and ‘traditional sector’. While it 
is open to speculation whether the Social Development Index may or may not proxy 
social capital, it is clear that it does not measure social capital according to its definition. 
The data behind the index are results of accumulation of human and physical capital, and 
economic processes such as the degree of structural change and urbanisation. This is 
related to the confusion in the literature as whether one is explaining being relatively poor 
or growing relatively slow. This issue will be returned to in the concluding section. 
 
Temple (1999) is pleased by the fact that when he groups the countries in the sample in 
three groups “the African countries fall neatly into the first group - that associated with 
the most traditional societies. Thus, this variable does seem to offer some hope of 
removing the stubborn Africa dummy.” (Ibid:324) In that context it is worth mentioning 
that the only countries that are not African and classified in the least socially developed 
group is Afghanistan, Laos, Nepal, Yemen, South-Vietnam and Yemen. In this respect it 
could be argued that one is just redefining the puzzle elsewhere, creating a dummy by 
another name. It is also problematic that the African exception – Botswana, is not 
included. Botswana grew very rapidly throughout the period, and is often used as the 
example that ethnicity and democracy matters, as the country has one main language – 
Tswana and has remained relatively democratic throughout the period. It is unlikely, 
however, that Botswana would have scored significantly different on the A-M index in 
1957.   
 
ii)  Institutional Quality 
 
The empirical growth literature firsts attempts to appreciate the importance of 
institutional quality on economic growth are associated with Mauro (1995) and Knack 
and Keefer (1995) both papers are earlier referred to here. The problem with the 
institutional quality as with a social development index is that it does not cover the   20
analytical term ‘social capital’ accurately. As mentioned, there are problems with the 
direction of causation. Higher income level is associated with higher spending and 
therefore higher quality institutions. The evidence is furthermore impressionistic in 
method and sporadic in coverage, and the measures are made at times where from an 
African point of view the quality of the institution after a growth failure is taken to 
explain the preceding growth failure. In Mauro (1995:706) the final sentence of the 
conclusion reminds of this problem. “[T]his paper has not analyzed the reverse causal 
link from poverty to bad institutions, which may deserve further study.” This brings us to 
another problem, while the measures can identify differing quality of institutions, the 
literature does not inform us of the lower threshold of institutional quality. Recall the 
growth evidence for Africa. There was seemingly possible to grow very rapidly with low 
quality institutions at times. This point is similar to the one made earlier about the self-
evident link between high income and high development of other social aspects, but the 
unresolved line of causality when it comes to economic growth.  
 
 
iii)  Ethnic Fractionalization  
 
The obvious advantage of this variable is that it is not an economic variable, and as such 
it avoids the issues of endogeniety associated with the previous two proxies for social 
capital. It can be satisfactorily viewed as a pure ‘social’ variable as it does not have 
immediate economic causes. In the regressions it is supposed to proxy trust – providing 
for economic transactions, and at the macroeconomic policy level – unity and fairness in 
policy formulation.  Attempting to define Social Capital Collier writes “Social capital is 
social because it involves some non-market process which nevertheless has economic 
effects.” (Collier 1988 quoted in Fine 2001:123) And he continues: “The economic 
effects are consequently not “internalised” into the decision calculus of each agent by the 
prices faced in markets. In the language of economics, they are externalities.” This 
definition does not cohere with the supposed relationship between ethnicity and 
economic effect, and how this effect is supposedly translated. While ethnicity is a social 
arrangement that may have economic effects, the prices is internalized in the prices faced   21
in the market. This is precisely the claim made by Collier (and other scholars such as 
Bates 1981, 1983). The pricing policy is supposedly determined by ethnic belonging of 
the rulers. Jomo Kenyatta priced coffee well because he was Kikuyu, Félix Houphouët-
Boigny favoured high cacao prices because he descended from cacao plantation owners 
of the Baoule. So in other words the main economic effect of ethnicity should be 
pronounced in the national pricing policies.  
 
While the measure of ethnicity might be exogenous, it could be still claimed that this 
separation of economic and social arrangement is not consistently applied to the whole 
world. One regards Kenya as divided between Kalenjin and Kikuyu, but does not regard 
Belgium similarly divided by Flemish and French speakers. The difference in language is 
of course a definition issue, United Kingdom is considered an English speaking country, 
and not a heterogeneous state formation where rivalry between English, Gaelic, Scottish, 
Welsh and Irish is pronounced in language, politics, culture and violence. Africa is 
considered to consist of between 900 and 2400 languages at the highest measure. 
However, these numbers are inflated by that the linguists where European from different 
origins themselves. In reality 90 percent of Africans speak one of the fifteen main 
languages. (Prah: quoted in Dag og Tid:2005). This means that the linguistic barrier is 
smaller than the measure indicates, but this does not automatically imply that ethnic 
belonging is unimportant or  has not got any economic effects. 
 
It is important however that the measure is accurate in order to correctly assess the 
effects, and for causes to be correctly identified. Ethnic rivalry is in its extreme 
expression war and violence. Ethnic violence has been given renewed attention and 
importance by the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. It is then worth noting that the Hutu and 
the Tutsi share language, culture and religion, but is separated mainly by land holdings 
and a belief in a different ethno-genesis. This division would not have been picked up by 
a linguistic measure then neither in Rwanda nor Burundi which both have been troubled 
by violence. Furthermore, there is evidence indicating the conflict was not purely racial. 
Andre and Platteau (1996) in a micro study of a hill in Rwanda found that among the 27   22
murdered people at that location only one was actually Tutsi
10. They further found that 
the murders were economically motivated as large older landowners were typical victims. 
Lamarchand (in Marysse and Reyntjens 2006:69) agrees with this point. “In many 
instances, the dynamics of grass-root murders were closely related to intra-ethnic class 
differences, with land ownership, rather than ethnicity being the key determinant of the 
victim’s identity.”  
 
It has also been mentioned that there is no clear-cut relationship between the number of 
ethnic group and political instability. Ethnic multitude is not a problem in itself. On the 
other hand there have been wars on the continent that made economic growth nearly 
impossible in some countries for a longer or shorter period. Some of these were 
ethnically motivated, or at least ethnic sentiment was at times mobilized to create support 
for the war and unrest. However, this amounts to a small growth effect on average, and 
are special cases not typical ones. It is also important to know that the general view 
among historians, anthropologist and sociologists that ethnicity is that ethnicity is not 
primordial, but contingent. If ethnicity is misused by leaders to generate mobilisation of 
people for political ends, it is perhaps the scientist’s role to keep a cool head and point to 
the short historical durability of such sentiments. An economist like Englebert (2000:8) 
drawing on his own work and that of Easterly and Levine (1997) and Mauro (1995) 
found that the effects of this lack of horizontal and vertical legitimacy of the state arising 
from this high ethnic fragmentation is so important he finds it suitable to call for 
‘territorial adjustment’ in Africa. This is a premature conclusion. Collier (1998: 
Discussion Appendix) when questioned about the importance of ethnicity as a concept 
after presenting a paper on the political economy of ethnicity replied that “there is a 
statistical significant relationship between democracy and ethnicity” but that “we do not 
know exactly what that means”.  
 
The case of Tanzania was briefly mentioned earlier. Easterly and Levine found that it has 
the highest ethnic fractionalization measured, and explicitly thinks that this can explain 
the whole growth shortfall between Japan and Tanzania. Again, recall that, as for the 
                                                 
10 The basic presentation of the first wave of the conflict is that Hutu were targeting Tutsi   23
whole of Africa on average, this growth shortfall was generated by a negative averaged 
growth in the 1980s, while growth in the 1960s and in the 1970s until the first oil shock 
was rapid. In the historiography of Tanzania there is no major work (to the knowledge of 
this author) that emphasises the effect of ethnicity on economic growth of Tanzania. It is 
also highly unlikely that a the economic integration of Mtwara region in South, and the 
Arusha region in north is hampered by linguistic or ethnic differences. Rather the major 
impediment will be and has been the costly investments in infrastructure required to 
integrate them meaningfully. At the present time, it is also very unlikely that this would 
be an economically sustainable investment. The Nyerere Government could on the other 
hand be said to be one that invested heavily in social capital, by emphasising universal 
literacy in Swahili, income equality and the promotion of social cohesion through the 
construction of community villages (many scholarly works documents this see for 
example Hyden: 1980).  However, in the 1980s the cumulative effects of falling exports 
and rising imports proved a too burdensome economic reality and growth and 
development failed.  
 
Finally, the argument of the effect of trust having an effect through ethnicity is 
problematic with regards to the micro-level and macro-level coherence. It is true that 
social capital can have an important economic effect for an individual. Take this 
example. A Hausa in Niger might get easy access to credit to engage in commercial 
activity. This credit is supplied by a Hausa credit network, and the economic effect is 
therefore exogenously determined by his or her ethnicity. Similarly, there might be a 
Fulani in Niger who is denied credit from the Hausa on the basis of his ethnicity. It could 
also be argued, plausibly or not, that in reality there was an untapped supply of credit and 
therefore this constituted an economic loss. It is important to remember that the credit 
exists on the basis of ethnic trust in the first place, and that therefore it is not a real loss, 
just a real gain. The trust-based credit market then exist in the absence (momentarily or 
not) of a either a central credit facility or the lack of useful collateral. In sum the 
ethnically trust based credit network is a substitute in the absence of any other 
opportunity. This amounts to a complicated calculation of the cost of exclusion versus the 
cost of inclusion on the microeconomic level for the individual, on the macro economic   24
level though this effect is not clear cut. If one argues from the real case – that the 
economic activity takes place because of exogenously determined trust, the ethnicity is a 
gain. If it argued from the ideal case – then there is a lack of a perfect financial market, 
and ethnicity then is an observable deviance from this perfectly functioning market. This 




The usefulness of social capital as an analytical tool has been acknowledged, but its 
limitations has been noted. While social capital has important economic effects on the 
microeconomic level its aggregate economic effect is more elusive. While differences in 
social arrangements can be observed from country to country, it is more uncertain 
whether this can be translated into a coherent conclusions on its effect on economic 
growth through cross country regressions. With regards to the pattern of economic 
growth in Africa, the defining character has been a post 1974 retrogression, and this 
review takes this acknowledgment to point to the limited validity of using social capital 
as a independent variable explaining growth. At this point this paper agrees with other 
authors like Foley and Edwards (2000) that social capital on the macroeconomic level is 
better understood as an outcome than a cause. This conclusion is supported by an analysis 
of the proxies used for social capital in the litterature. It is held that social capital as 
understood by ethnicity is rather contingent, than determinant of economic factors.  
 
There are limits to knowledge about the African growth experience through the method 
of cross country growth regressions. This problem derives from the fact that most of the 
African economies on average grew slowly. There was a general lack of real convergence 
growth, as the relatively poorer African economies was hard hit by the economic shocks 
of the latter part of the period. This amounts to that explaining a growth shortfall has 
been confused with explaining a lower level of income. In the search for finding variables 
that can explain this growth shortfall this has in practice resulted in something which can 
be called a subtraction approach. The subtraction approach can be described as taking the 
characteristics of an underdeveloped country on one side, and comparing it with an   25
underdeveloped country on the other side. The differences between them are taken to 
explain underdevelopment. The lack of development has in the case of the papers 
reviewed here have been concluded to be a lack of social capital. This approach derives 
from the notion of ‘prerequisites for industrialisation’ and is inherently connected to the 
idea of uni-linear development – that is there is only one path to modernity. This notion 
has been seriously discredited by economic history scholars, perhaps most clearly by 
Sugihara (1999) who distinguishes between a European and Asian path of economic 
development. In response Austin (2002) has proposed a African path of development 
along those lines, relying on the differences in factor endowments. These efforts and 
others highlight the futility of the subtraction approach, rather than mapping out a path 
valid for all countries a better strategy is to appreciate each economy and regions 
particularities, and in this way find the development inhibiting factors. Accordingly, 
human capital and infrastructural provisions should be compared with the individual 
economy’s requirements, and not with a world wide standard. A proposed framework for 
analysing African economic performance then, is that the internal bottlenecks should be 
found, and that interregional comparisons makes sense in external factors only. The 
subtraction approach and the list of pre-requisites are kept alive by the regression 
literature. Its explanatory value is low. There should be made no automatic assumptions 
of causal relationships simply deriving from well know differences between developed 
and underdeveloped economies.  
 
Linked with the subtraction approach is the revival of the vicious circle of 
underdevelopment, where underdevelopment is take to explain itself. This does not 
cohere with the actual growth record. The African economies have displayed both growth 
and retrogression, they have not been captured in a low level equilibrium where poverty 
has reproduced itself. Therefore, the factors launched and the circular reasoning in which 
they are embedded does not leave us convinced. It is in this context the criticisms posed 
specifically in section 2 should be seen. What we know already before reading the 
regression literature is that Africa has performed relatively worse in GDP per capita 
terms over the post-colonial period as a whole. The African economies are poorer. 
Knowing that we would also assume that they rank lower on education, health and   26
infrastructural indicators, it is also reasonable to assume that these poor countries receive 
more aid, and have less developed financial markets. This is confirmed by the regression 
literature. What it does not tell us, and what I would think would be the key to 
understanding economic performance, is why did the African economies grow and why 
did they retrogress. To answer this question circular reasoning based on observed 
correlations is not particularly helpful. 
 
Institutional quality or social capital has become the all embracing factor explaining 
divergence in economic growth. It is explicit in the notion of conditional convergence. If 
one is willing to accept two of Gerschenkron’s (1962) propositions a ‘subtraction 
approach’ or regressing with institutional indexes (Knack and Keefer 1995) makes little 
sense. The first proposition is that late development is going to be considerably different. 
This difference is to be found in the design of the institutional framework. The second 
that follows the first – there is no general list of prerequisites for growth, and that these 
prerequisites can not be distinguished from the ‘final’ result of development. Efficient 
institutions is a characteristic of a well functioning developed economy. Acknowledging 
this proposal is completely in conflict with such exercises most famously done by 
Kaufman et al. (1999), where institutional quality is an indicator taking values ranging 
from –2.5 to 2.5.  Here a one size fits all perspective finds its highest level A brief 
summary of successful development experiences in the 20
th century would inform us that 
there are no such one size fits them all. Adopting ‘best practice paradigm’ is a fallacy, not 
because of the informal institutions as North (1990) argues, but in two other ways 1) 
because the optimal design of institutions is not an absolute, but changing with regard to 
development level, and; 2) because efficient institutions are a result of and not an initial 
condition for economic development. 
 
The current use of the term social capital in the regression literature explaining African 
economic growth conveys little or no meaning. The term has been poorly defined and its 
proxies used do not cohere with theory nor empirics. While the social side of economic 
activity continues to be important and interesting, its empirical application in the 
regression literature has produced results of questionable quality and conclusions drawn   27
on weak evidence. The paper will encourage future research that considers social capital 
as an outcome of economic growth. Furthermore a desirable direction of research would 
be to consider the conditions that fostered rapid economic growth in the first half of the 
post-colonial period compared to the retrogression in the second half. This calls for a 
dynamic explanation that demands better measurements and clearer definitions.     
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